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Abstract. - This artiele focuses on the effects of the Spanish Empire's crisis on the 
Genoese Atlantic trade, which in the early 19th century shifted its main commercial axis 
from the port of Cadiz to Buenos Aires and Montevideo. Despite the Republic of Genoa's 
intemational marginalization, during the 18th century Ligurians continued to participate 
in the Spanish colonial trade due to the persistent productive and naval shortfalls of the 
monarchy: the monopolistic port of Cadiz became their main operative center. The Napo-
leonic wars, the consequent crisis of the Spanish Empire and the collapse of the oligarchi-
cal republic, which culminated in the annexation of Genoa to the Sardinian kingdom, 
decisively damaged the Genoese system of participation in the Carrera de Indias . But the 
conjuncture also created the conditions for their autonomous Atlantic adventure. The neu-
trality of the Sardinian flag and the traditional ties woven in the Iberían trade allowed 
Ligurian ves seis to play an essential role of commercial intermediation between Spain and 
the lost colony of Rio de la Plata. Buenos Aires became the new destination of many Ligu-
rían migrants, who contributed to local economic growth and created tight bonds with the 
new host society. 
CADIZ, THE CORE OF THE 18TH-CENTURY GENOESE ATLANTIC TRADE 
Genoese merehants and businessmen participated in the Atlantie trade 
from the very first stage of the Iberian expansion overseas. As is well 
known, they established a veritable symbiotie allianee with the Habs-
burgs. By supporting Spanish imperial projeets and taking advantage 
ofthe Crown's problems with solveney, they aequired trading lieenses 
in the Indias and dominated European finanee until the Spanish 
• 1 wish to thank Alan Gallay of the Ohio State University for his useful comments 
on the essay. 
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"bankruptcy" of 1627.1 The Hispanic-Genoese alliance carne to an 
end with the Treaty ofMünster (1648), which formalized the succes-
sion of the United Provinces over Genoa for transport of American 
silver to Flanders in exchange for countless royal concessions.2 The 
los s of the privileged re1ationship with the Crown, however, did not 
paralyze Genoese trade in the Spanish Empire. In a context in which 
the enjoyment of Atlantic trade benefits was c1ose1y linked to political 
and naval power, the Genoese traders, who couldn't count on political 
support of the mother-city or on a competitive merchant fleet, found 
in the Spanish monarchy new means to survive. By adopting multiple 
strategies of integration in the host society and trade institutions, they 
continued to prosper within the Spanish "monopoly", and the port of 
Cadiz, emporium ofthe Carrera de Indias, became one ofthe largest 
Ligurian cornmercial settlements ofthe 18th century.3 
These ties of reciprocity were particularly relevant in the mari time 
sector due to the Bourbon authorities' need to cope with increasing 
naval competition in the Atlantic. In order to solve the problem of the 
chronic lack of vessels, aggravated by the War of the Spanish Succes-
sion, the Bourbons adopted two different strategies: they invested in 
I Ramón Carande, Carlos Vy sus banqueros (Barcelona 1987, 3rd ed.); Felipe Ruiz 
Martín, "Las finanzas españolas en tiempos de Felipe II": Cuadernos de Historia. 
Anexos de la Revista Hispania 2 (1968), p. 109-173; idem, "Los hombres de negocios 
genoveses de España durante el siglo XV!": Hermann Kellenbenz, Fremde Kaufleute 
aulder Iberischen Halbinsel (Cologne 1970), p. 84-99. 
2 Carmen Sanz Ayán, "Asentistas holandeses en las finanzas de la Monarquía his-
pánica, 1680-1715": Diálogos Hispánicos de Amsterdam 16 (1995), p. 139-156; eadem, 
"Negociadores y capitales holandeses en los sistemas de abastecimientos de pertrechos 
navales de la monarquía hispánica durante el siglo XVII": Hispania . Revista Española 
de Historia 182 (1992), p. 915-945; Stanley J. SteinlBarbara Stein, Si/ver, Trade and 
War. Spain and America in the Making 01 Early Modern Europe (Baltimore 2(00). 
3 Catia Brilli, "Mercaderes genoveses en el Cádiz del siglo XVIII. Crisis y reajuste 
de una simbiosis secular": Ana Crespo Solana (ed.), Comunidades transnacionales: 
colonias de mercaderes extranjeros en el mundo atlántico, 1500-1830 (Madrid 2010), 
p. 83-102; eadem, "Administrando la debilidad. Los mercaderes genoveses y sus insti-
tuciones en la capital del comercio hispánico dieciochesco": Bartolomé YunlFemando 
Ramos (eds .), De Estambul a Potosí: Instituciones y Crecimiento Econ6mico en el 
Mediterráneo y el Atlántico, 1500-1800 (Valencia, forthcoming); CarIo Molina, "L' emi-
grazione Ligure a Cadice, 1709-1854": Atti della societa Ligure di Storia Patria CVlII, 
2 (1994), p. 285-377. 
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local shipbuilding by establishing the Carraca arsenal in Cadiz, and 
authorized the acquisition of foreign ships by only charging a duty fee 
(the extrangería tax). In 1752 the Genoese consul in Cadiz reported 
the arrival of "120 Genoese shipwrights and caulkers to build vessels 
in the arsenal for this Crown" , many of which had been hired in Genoa 
while others were "volunteers".4 Nevertheless, as the local shipbuil-
ding sector was mainly oriented towards the construction of war-
ships, it was never capable of fulfilling the mari time trade's needs, 
and still needed to purchase foreign ves seIs . This also resulted from 
the convenience of collecting the extrangería tax rather than invest 
capital in the shipyards.5 
Between 1717 and 1778, only 130 (26.4 %) of the 492 ships engaged 
in the Carrera de Indias (whose origin has been identified) were from 
Spanish or American yards; 24 % of them were built in Great Britain, 
23 % in France and 10.4 % (51) in Italy. The majority (37) of the latter 
carne from Genoa.6 In sorne cases the rent or acquisition of these 
vessels was managed directly by Spanish authorities;7 more often, the 
transactions were between private owners who instructed the Genoese 
captains to frnd buyers for their ships.8 Ligurians also contributed to the 
development of a private shipbuilding sector in Spain. The whole-
sale merchant Domingo Colombo owned a great shipyard in Puntales, 
4 Archivio di Stato di Genova (hereinafter ASG), Archivio Segreto, n. 2673, Mon-
tesisto, Cadiz, 27th of November, 1752. 
5 Marina Alfonso Mola, "La marina mercante colonial en la legislación borbónica, 
1700-1828": Carlos Martínez Shaw (ed .), El derecho y el mar en la España moderna 
(Granada 1995), p. 173-215. 
6 Antonio García-Baquero González, Cádiz y el Atlántico, 1717-1778 (Seville 
1976), p. 105. 
7 In 1720, the intendente general de Marina Patiño bought three ships by the 
Genoese captains Lanfranco, Sanguinetto and Oneto; four years later the Crown 
acquired from Oneto another vessel. ASG, Archivio Segreto, n. 2673, Lorenzo Maria 
Grassi, Cadiz, October 1, 1720; ASG, Archivio Segreto, n. 2673, Gio. Dom.o Pavia, 
Cadiz, May 2, 1724. 
8 These practices were so common that in 1720 the Genoese consul of Cadiz 
reported: "the [Genoese] mediocre ships sail under the French flag, while the good ones 
are sold [in Spain]". ASG, Archivio Segreto, n. 2673, Lorenzo Maria Grassi, Cadiz, 30th 
of July, 1720. See also ASG, Archivio Segreto, n. 2673, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, 23th of 
October 1791. 
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near Cadiz;9 in the same place Jacome Patron owned several ware-
houses for the sale of naval supplies. 10 
Ligurians did more than support the Spanish shipbuilding industry. 
By obtaining naturalization or entrusting their business to their sons 
bom in Spain they were able to access the legal circuits of colonial 
trade and organize expeditions with their own vessels: in 1793, they 
owned 33 Spanish-flag ships enrolled in the Carrera de Indias. I I 
The Ligurian prosperity in late 18th-century Cadiz confirms that 
the decree of Libre Comercio (1778) had not damaged the position of 
the port. In fact, although Cadiz had lost its status of monopolistic 
emporium, in the last quarter of the 18th century it continued to absorb 
more than 70 % of colonial trade.12 
The Spanish monarchy 's war commitments and trade indirectly 
boosted Ligurians to participate in local maritime activities at diffe-
rent levels, inc1uding navigation. The Genoese presence in the crews 
of Spanish vessels had ancient roots. Because of their Catholic faith 
and the secular ties that bound them to the Iberian coasts, Genoese 
were considered more reliable than other foreigners. They also were 
favoured by the Spanish navy's scarcely regulated methods of 
recruitment, traditionally based more on practical needs than on a 
determined legal regimeP 
With the rise of Bourbons to the Spanish throne (1700), however, 
seafarers were submitted to a growing attention by the authorities, 
who attempted to control and in crease maritime forces for military 
purposes by creating a seafarers' register, the so-called matrícula de 
mar. The first step was a real orden in 1726 which tried to make the 
registration attractive by offering exemption from Army recruitment. 
9 Archivo Histórico Provincial de Cádiz (hereinafter AHPC) , Not. Cádiz, 0048 , 
Testamento de Domingo [Vallarino] Colombo, 1803. 
10 Archivo General de Indias (hereinafter AGI) , Arribadas 209A, Ordenes e 
informes sobre licencias de embarco, Cádiz, 18th of August 1810. 
11 AG!, Consulados 929. This rank of great merchant shipowners was dominated by 
a nucIeus of naturalized wholesalers who possessed two or more vessels coming from 
Genoa or other European and American ports. See Marina Alfonso Mola, "Los navieros 
naturalizados de Cadiz , 1778-1820": Antonio García-Baquero González (ed.), La bur-
guesía de negocios en la Andalucía de la Ilustración , vol. I (Cadiz 1991), 
p.209-226. 
12 Antonio García-Baquero González , El Libre Comercio al examen gaditano 
(Cadiz 1998). 
I3 Mola, "La marina mercante colonial" (note 5) , p. 173-215 . 
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But this was a superfluous privilege, for seafarers traditionally enjo-
yed exemption because their skills were needed at sea. The new provi-
sion also granted to registered seafarers preceden ce over the non-
registered in participation in transatlantic shipping, which was the 
most lucrative employment at sea. 14 These strategies of persuasion 
were accompanied by forced recruitments in which Ligurians were 
both the agents and the victims. The case of Commander Spinola is 
particularly meaningful in this regard. In 1730 he was instructed by 
the Spanish Crown to go to Genoa with 150 soldiers to acquire a ves-
sel and recruit the greatest possible number of seafarers .15 
In 1737 the Bourbon authorities offered to registered seamen some 
additional "privileges", such as an exemption from quartering troops 
in their houses, and the right to practice maritime activities in an 
exclusive way. This was clearly a gimmick to make the registration 
mandatory. They offered the same privileges to the foreign seafarers 
who were married or avecindados (residents) in Spain; the other 
Catholic foreigners had full "freedom" to serve in the Armada Naval 
(the Spanish navy) with the rank that corresponded to their skills.16 
The ordenanzas of 1748 and 1751, which subordinated the enjoyment 
of those "privileges" to the service in the Armada Naval in case of 
war, unavoidably bound mari time activities to military lifeP However, 
the reiteration of ordenanzas reveals the matrícula's scarce attractive-
ness, as it represented a real menace for a sector which was traditio-
naHy regulated by autonomous and flexible organisationallogics; the 
frequent desertions and episodes of military authorities' corruption in 
order to avoid the service were the natural consequences. 
Parallel to this, the need to support colonial trade forced the Crown 
to authorize the foreigners' participation in transatlantic shipping. The 
Free Trade Decree (art. 3) established that aH captains, patrones, 
maestros, oficiales de mar and the two-thirds of the sailors who were 
14 Roberto Femández Díaz/Carlos Martínez Shaw, "Las revistas de inspección de la 
Matrícula de Mar en el siglo XVIII": Martínez Shaw, El derecho y el mar (note 5), 
p.241-271. 
15 ASG,Archivio Segreto, n. 2673, Prasca, Cadiz, 17th of January 1730. 
16 Ordenanza del Infante Almirante, Art. 5,18 de octubre de 1737: Francisco Javier 
de Salas, Historia de la matrícula de mar y exámen de varios sistemas de reclutamiento 
mar(timo (Madrid 1879), p. 169. 
17 OIga López Miguel/Magda Mirabet Cucala, "La institucionalización de la 
Matrícula de Mar: textos normativos y consecuencias para la gente de mar y maes-
tranza": Martínez Shaw, El derecho y el mar (note 5), p. 217-239. 
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engaged in the Carrera had to be Spanish or naturalized, while the 
remainder could be foreigners: they had to be Catholics, registered in 
the matrícula, and were obligated to return to Spain under the captain 's 
responsibility.18 However, the chronic scarcity of matriculated sea-
farers induced the Crown to revoke that disposition a few years latero 
By 1785 it was possible to engage foreign seamen - but also ship-
wrights and caulkers - whether or not they were registered in the 
matrícula and those who had not yet served in the Armada: the only 
prerequisite was a special request presented by the shipowner, or by 
the captain, to maritime authorities.19 In this way, foreigners could 
continue to embark for the Indies without being considered illegal and 
not having to pay the travel: once they arrived at their destination, it 
was easy for them to leave the crew to find buyers for the goods they 
usually carried with them and establish their business. 
The absence of the Genoese flag in the Atlantic, thus, does not 
mean that the Republic had reduced its commercial relations to the 
Euro-Mediterranean coasts. Ligurians continued to participate in colo-
nial trade thanks to the Bourbonic reforms' intrinsic limits, which 
allowed them to prosper in the capital of the Spanish monopoly by 
operating in symbiosis with the monarchy's needs. This system was 
irrevocably damaged by the crisis of the colonial order in the early 
19th century. But, at the same time, Latin American independence 
opened new spaces to maritime competition in the Atlantic. 
THE NAPOLEONIC W ARS AND THE CRISIS OF THE GENOESE TRADE SYSTEM 
The Napoleonic Wars submitted Ligurian trade to a double crisis. The 
French invasion of the Republic in 1797 determined the fall of the 
Republic's oligarchic system, which was followed by a devastating 
commercial crisis as a consequence of the British blockade of the port 
of Genoa. The Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the abdication of 
Fernando VII in favour of Joseph Bonaparte gave impetus to the inde-
pendence movements in Spanish America, striking once and for all 
18 Reglamento y Aranceles Reales para el comercio libre de España a Indias, de 12 
de octubre de 1778, en la Imprenta de Pedro Marin (Seville 1978). 
19 Real Orden para que, a falta de marinería matriculada, se pueda admitir la que no 
lo esté, 30 de septiembre de 1785: AGI, Consulados 97, Consulado de Cargadores a 
Indias, Secretaria, 1720-1817, Impresos e documentos curiosos y varios, exp. 15. 
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Cadiz's role of cornmercial intermediation between the two shores of 
the Atlantic. 
The occupation of the Republic had unexpected and disruptive 
effects. Requisitions of war, infrastructural damages and cornmercial 
isolation became even more serious after the annexation of Liguria to 
France in 1805. The imperial authorities further damaged Genoese 
trade by extending the French customs system to Liguria; they also 
diverted neutral ships to Toulon and Marseille, and gave preceden ce 
to the export of silk from Lyon.20 
Until annexation the Ligurian maritime trade had prospered thanks 
to cabotage shipping, which was traditionally exempted from formali-
ties.21 French customs officials, instead, were particularly zealous 
imposing duties on coastal navigation and discouraging foreign ships' 
landings in order to prevent smuggling. The precautionary embargo 
imposed on allied flags and the Spanish uprising against French occu-
pation completely interrupted direct trade between Genoa and the Ibe-
rian Peninsula. 
These limitations were accentuated by the presence of Barbary 
pirates on Sicilian and Sardinian coasts, but also by the untenable 
French military policy. Due to the Republic's traditional choice for 
political neutrality, Liguria was abad basin of recruits . For this rea-
son, every attempt made from 1797 to organize local armed forces 
failed, obligating the new adrninistration to resort to French soldiers.22 
Thus, Napoleon tried to recruit the seafarers with the aim of organi-
zing a fleet capable of coping with the British enemy. Once again, the 
episodes of escape and resistance were numerous.23 The Napoleonic 
expedition to Egypt cost the Ligurian merchant navy all of its large 
vessels, so that by 1804 it was almost exclusively made up of cabo-
tage ships.24 It was precisely the incompatibility between political 
autonomy and the capacity of rnilitary control which led to the annexa-
20 Luigi Bulferetti/Claudio Costantini, Industria e Commercio in Liguria nelt'eta 
del Risorgimento, 1700-1861 (Milan 1966), p. 261. 
21 See Luca Lo Basso, Il Sud dei Genovesi. Traffici marittimi e pratiche mercantili 
tra l'Italia Meridionale, Genova e Marsiglia nel Settecento (forthcoming). 
22 Giovanni Assereto, "Coscrizione e politica militare negli anni francesi": idem, Le 
metamorfosi delta Repubblica. Saggi di storia Genovese tra il XVI e il XIX secolo 
(Savona 1999), p. 308-310. 
23 Ibidem, p. 314. 
24 In 1804, 1,250 of the 1,400 Lígurian ships were "liuti", feluccas, and boats. Bul-
feretti/Costantini, Industria e Commercio (note 20), p. 273. 
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tion of Liguria by France. The consequent extension of the French 
standards of recruitment to the former republic led to the organization 
of 26 drafts for the army, which affected about 31,500 individuals and 
multiplied the episodes of emigration and rebellion.25 Even the 
administration's efforts to make a meticulous register of aH the indivi-
duals who were engaged in maritime activities in order to strengthen 
the French naval force failed and caused a massive abandonment of 
the maritime professions. 
After the annexation of Liguria to the Sardinian kingdom sanctio-
ned by the Congress of Vienna (1815), the region remained in a state 
of economic isolation. The lack of capital and the lasting custom 
barrier with Sardinia maintained the merchant fleet in a condition only 
sufficient to make modest cabotage trade. Besides, in 1816 the govern-
ment of Turin decided to re-establish the obligatory conscription, 
which had been abolished only two years before because of its huge 
unpopularity. 
During the reign of CarIo Felice, the government began to deal 
with the problem of maritime trade by initiating a protectionist policy 
that led to commercial agreements with the Ottomans in 1823 and 
with Morocco two years latero In 1825 the government established a 
sliding scale of taxes on the importation of cereals, wine, and oil. 
While this measure granted to Sardinan ships the quasi-monopoly in 
the transport of grains, it discouraged the international trade around 
the port of Genoa, as many foreign ships began to prefer Livorno. 
Even the trade in the Black Sea was severely affected by the conflicts 
between Greece and Turkey, and between Turkey and Russia. The 
commercial difficulties were accompanied by serious problems with 
the fleet: in 1815 only 966 ships remained, 882 of which had a ton-
nage less than 100 tons.26 
In paraHel, the center of Genoese Atlantic trade system had begun 
its irreversible decline. The crisis of Cadiz started with the war against 
Great Britain (1796-1801), during which the port was submitted to a 
prolonged maritime blockade by Admiral Nelson. The blockade seve-
rely damaged Ligurian commercial settlement. It was decimated by 
25 Assereto, "Coscrizione e politica militare" (note 22), p. 315. 
26 Ugo Marchese, "L'industria amatoriale ligure dal1816 al 1859": Archivio Econo-
mico dell'Unificazione Italiana, vol. VI, fase. 1,1957, p. 11. 
The Genoese Response to the Collapse of the Spanish Empire 255 
bankrupcies,27 forced contributions to sustain the war effort, and the 
numerous requisitions of their ships. This happened in 1797 to Ligu-
rian captain Bozzo, who was coming from Martinique with his pola-
ere under Spanish flag: he was captured by the British Navy and for-
cibly sent to Gibraltar, where he was robbed ofhis load and dismissed 
without receiving payment for the ship's hire.28 
The truce granted by the Peace of Amiens (1802) was soon inter-
rupted by the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1808. In 1812, Cadiz 
was completely isolated by the siege of Napoleonic troops. In these 
years the process of the Spanish colonies' movement towards inde-
pendence was too embryonic to have appreciable effects on the penin-
sular economy. The exception was the viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, 
whose struggle for emancipation interrupted the direct trade with 
Spain since 1810. The volume of trade from Cadiz to the Indias, in 
spite of a certain recovery in 1808-1810 and 1815-1818, gradually 
decreased in accordance with the success of the Hispano-American 
movements of independence, and reached its lowest level in 1819-
1820.29 
The commercial crisis of Cadiz is reflected in the rapid disappear-
ance of local shipowners, who diminished from 300 to 20 between 
1800 and 1824.30 Those who had well-established interests in the 
colonies in sorne cases decided to abandon Cadiz and join their parents 
or associates overseas. This was the case of the aforementioned Ligu-
rian shipowner Jacome Patron: in 1810, after the total ruin of his 
affairs, he asked for a royallicense to go to Montevideo and join his 
TI Julián B. Ruiz Rivera, El Consulado de Cádiz. Matrfcula de Comerciantes, 1730-
1823 (Cadiz 1988), p. 101-102. See also Antonio García-Baquero González, Comercio 
colonial y guerras revolucionarias. La decadencia económica de Cádiz a raíz de la 
emancipación americana (Seville 1972), p. 219-242; and García-Baquero González, El 
Libre Comercio al examen gaditano (note 12), p. 99 . 
28 ASG, Archivio Segreto, n. 2672A, 11 Console Generale della Repubblica Ligure 
in Cadice Andrea Gherardi all'Incaricato d' Affari presso S.M .C. [Ottavio SappiaJ, 16th 
of November 1798. 
29 John Robert Fisher, "Commerce and the Imperial Decline: Spanish Trade with 
Spanish America, 1787-1820": ]ournal oi Latin American Studies 30 (1981), p. 459-
479. 
30 Amedeo Lepore, "11 Mediterraneo Napoleonico. Spazi, merci, idee. Le vicende 
dei traffici coloniali e l'attivita di un' impresa mercantile a Cadice nel periodo del blocco 
continentale": Tiempos Modernos. Revista Electrónica de Historia Moderna 4, 9 (2003-
2004), p. 1-21, here: p. 16. 
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two uncles, who were well-off and able to help him .3 ' The prolonged 
crisis in Cadiz had dísruptive consequences on the whole population, 
oppressed by unemployment, an epidemic of yellow fever,32 and the 
local military policy. The Bourbonic adminístratíon, with the orde-
nanzas of 1802, implemented a program of seafarers' milítarisation 
which intended to regulate the maritime activities even in times of 
peace. This provision aimed to correct the deficiencies of the previous 
ordenanzas, which had unsuccesfully attempted to make the enroll-
ment attractíve by grantíng to seafarers the exclusive "privileges" of 
fishing and trading. 
The new ordenanzas' first concern was to transfer the territorial 
administration from civil to military personnel, who also received 
direct command over the conscripts. Then, in an attempt to limit 
desertions, the decree established rigid norms of conduct not only for 
the Armada, but also for mari time actívities. As a consequence many 
irregularitíes, even when they occurred on merchant vessels, became 
crimes under military jurisdiction: practicing lucratíve maritíme acti-
vities without prior registration and unauthorized boarding on domes-
tic or foreign ships were now punished with enrollment in military 
campaigns or wíth forced labour in the arsenals. The so-called "privi-
leges", instead, remained the same as those enunciated in 1737.33 
The ordenanzas of 1802 managed to increase the Spanish navy's 
quota of personnel, but they also caused a relevant haemorrhage of 
seamen, who in many cases emigrated overseas. This phenomenon 
became particularly evident in Cadiz, where the Consulado de Indias 
in 1804 denounced an alarming migration of sailors, shipwrights, and 
caulkers.34 According to the Consulado, seafarers tried to avoid ser-
vice in the Spanish navy by all means , due to the inevitable risks rela-
ted to it, as well as the amouot of time it took them to get paid; in 
many cases they preferred devoting themselves to smuggling or taking 
31 AGI, Arribadas 209A, Ordenes e informes sobre licencias de embarco, Cadiz, 
18th of August 1810. 
32 Archivio di Stato di Torino (hereinafter AST), Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice 
1790-1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, 22th of October 1819. 
33 López Miguel/Mirabet Cucala, "La institucionalización de la Matrícula de Mar" 
(note 17), p. 217-239. 
34 AGI , Consulados 62, exp. 11 , Representación del Consulado de Cádiz sobre el 
problema de la emigración de la marinería al extrangero, 17th of June 1804. 
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refuge in Latin American ports, where the growing number of vessels 
offered many occasions for employment and good wages. 
The extent of the migratory flow is confirmed by the Spanish 
authorities' increasing interest in foreigners which led to the promul-
gation of a more inclusive law in order to use them as a basin of 
recruitment. In 1807 the Crown ordered the compilation of a census 
where each foreigner had to specify whether he wanted to be con si de-
red as a transient or a natural, "so that we can treat him, regarding his 
rights as weH as his duties, with the distinction prescribed by the laws 
of the Kingdom".35 Then, due to the "current circumstances' compel-
ling needs" , the Crown ordered the immediate enlistment of non tran-
sient foreigners in the Army.36 In 1817, however, the Genoese consul 
of Cadiz revealed that the Crown had put its needs before the foreign-
ers' rights guaranteed by law: 
"The foreigners were traditionally exempted by extraordiary contributions, forced 
loans and rnilitary service [ ... ], but during the last war against France they were obli-
gated to the same services as the Nationals [ ... ]. AH the foreigners with the exception 
of the consuls were obligated to military service and to quarter the troops. At pre-
sent, they host the numerous soldiers who are waiting in the port to board for 
America" .37 
In his report on the conditions of the Spanish navy, Minister Vázquez 
Figueroa in 1812 complained that this strategic sector had been "anni-
hilated" by the govemment's "ignorance and bad faith" .38 One of the 
major pieces of evidence was the state of wages. They were so low 
that, as Figueroa said, sailors were "devoured by hunger" .39 The General 
Captain of the Department of Cadiz, José de Quevedo, expressed a 
similar opinion denouncing "the regrettable state of aH branches of the 
Royal Navy because of the authorities' indifference and contempt".4O 
In 1820 the Cortes attempted to remedy the situation by nullifying 
the matrículas de mar. Then, they entrusted the regulation of maritime 
activities and the seafarers' military service to civil officials. The Cor-
35 AGI, Consulados 98, Impresos y documentos varios y curiosos, 1771-1849, Bar-
tolomé Muñoz, Madrid, 6th of July 1807. 
36 Ibidem. 
37 My translation. AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790-1835, Andrea 
Gherardi, Cadiz, 10th of June 1817. 
38 Javier de Salas, Historia de la matrícula de mar (note 16), p. 234. 
39 Ibidem, p. 238. 
40 Ibidem, p. 243. 
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tes also exempted aH captains, patrones, shipowners, maritime trad-
ers, and fishing vessels' owners from service in the Armada.41 These 
new measures, however, could not help gain the seafarers' trust. It 
became clear in November 1822 at the calling of the Department of 
Ferrol's maritime forces, to which only 84 registered individuals out 
of 1,622 responded. AH of them were sick or otherwise unable to per-
forro service.42 Maritime activities in Spanish ports, thus, became less 
and less attractive both for the long established seafarers and for the 
new waves of Genoese migrants who fled from Liguria for similar 
reasons. 
THE SARDINIAN PENETRATION OF THE Río DE LA PLATA RoUTE 
As noted aboye, after the annexation of Genoa by the Sardinian king-
dom, the Ligurian merchant navy was reduced to a minimum. How-
ever, in a few years the local shipbuilding sector experienced a specta-
cular recovery owing to the private initiative of the coastal population. 
Because of a lack of government or other institutional support they 
resorted to traditional systems of familiar production based on impro-
vised yards along Ligurian coasts.43 The capital needed to finance the 
fleet's reconstruction carne from the modest but constant work of 
seafarers and small traders who invested their cabotage profits in ship-
building. Between 1816 and 1831 the number of ships doubled and 
the tonnage quadrupled.44 This growth revealed that Ligurians aimed 
to participate in Atlantic navigation; but the contemporary crisis of the 
Spanish imperial trade system centered on Cadiz led them to look for 
alternative routes. 
The annihilation of trade between Genoa and Cadiz is confirroed 
by the Guía General de los forasteros of the port, which noted that 
none of the 2,083 boats that entered the port in 1815 raised the Sardi-
41 Decreto XLVII. "Se extinguen las matrículas de mar y se establecen reglas para la 
navegación y el servicio militar de Marina": Colección de Decretos y Ordenes Gene-
rales de la primera legislatura de las Cortes Ordinarias de 1820 y 1821 desde 6 de julio 
hasta 9 de noviembre de 1820, tomo IV (Madrid 1821). 
42 Javier de Salas, Historia de la matrícula de mar (note 16), p. 271. 
43 Ugo Marchese, "L'industria ligure delle costruzioni navali dal 1816 al 1859": 
Archivio Economico dell'Unificazione Italiana, vol. VII, fase. 1, 1952, p.l. 
44 Giulio Giacchero, Storia economica del Settecento genovese (Genoa 1951). 
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nian flag.45 This situation certainIy resulted from the Ligurian mer-
chant fleet's state of prostration, but also the insecurity of the bay 
because of the corsairs - mosdy coming from Buenos Aires - who 
forced many merchant ships to unIoad in Gibraltar.46 
To maintain their trade in Spain, Ligurian captains resorted to their 
traditional strategy of sailing under other nations' flags.47 In parallel, 
they started to orientate their shipping towards other ports where they 
could access American or Asian goods. Their main destination became 
Gibraltar, due to the advantageous rates guaranteed by its status as a 
free port. In a few years the British pOrt superseded Cadiz in transat-
Iantic intermediation; the Spanish emporium, instead, in 1826 chose 
the path of protectionism, in the hope of recovering the reIevant Iosses 
caused by independence movements.48 Ligurians estabIished an 
important enclave in Gibraltar,49 through which Sardinian vessels ille-
gally shipped a volume of goods that in 1825, according to the French 
dipIomat Baron de Boislecomte, was greater than those sent from 
Genoa to the Spanish ports and even than those sent from the United 
States and the Low Countries.50 In Gibraltar, Ligurians mainly shipped 
ltalian and Russian wheat, returning to Genoa with goods coming from 
Asia and the Americas. 
In those years, Sardinian vessels made their first timid attempts to 
penetrate South America, driven by the dominant protectionism in 
Europe and the spaces opened by the crisis of the colonial empire. The 
Río de la Plata pOrts had been traditionally frequented by foreigners, 
especially Luso-Brazilians and their British allies, who reguIarIy used 
them since the 17th century as a backdoor for the smuggling of the 
45 Guía General de los forasteros de Cádizpara el año de 1816. Imprenta de D. 
Ramón Hoove, Plazuela del Cañón (Cadiz 1816). 
46 AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790-1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, 
23rd ofFebruary 1816. 
47 AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790-1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, 
7th ofMarch 1817. 
48 García-Baquero González, Comercio colonial y guerras revolucionarias (note 
27),p.246. 
49 Within a few years Gibraltar became one of the main destinations of Ligurian 
migrants: between the 1st of January 1824 and the 31th ofMay 1831 only 298 ofthem 
went to Cadiz, while those who went to Gibraltar were 913. Molina, "L'emigrazione 
Ligure a Cadice" (note 3), p. 360. 
50 Rafael Sánchez Mantero, Estudios Sobre Gibraltar. Política, diplomacia y con-
trabando en el siglo XIX (Cadiz 1999), p. 84 
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silver coming from the Peruvian city of Potosí;51 the same viceroyalty 
had been established in 1776 with the aim of combating foreign 
influence, but the Crown's projects had failed because of contingen-
cies of war. Spain 's involvement in the United States' War of Indepen-
dence alongside France led to a conflict with Great Britain (1779-
1783) which seriously damaged the Spanish monopolistic trade with 
the colonies. Thus, in 1781 the Crown decided to open the Carrera de 
Indias to the Portuguese flag, allowing foreign merchants to penetrate 
the Lisbon-Rio de Janeiro-Buenos Aires route.52 
The same happened during the British Navy's blockade of Cadiz in 
1797, which induced the Crown to open the Carrera de Indias to neu-
tral ships. This provision was revoked in 1799, but the return to tradi-
tional monopolistic restrictions was impeded by the numerous deroga-
tions that the Crown had to grant in order to maintain the fiscal and 
trade flows between the two shores of the Atlantic. This was because 
Spanish merchants who were operating in America had reluctance 
towards giving up the advantages they had acquired with the liberali-
sation.53 The neutral trade decree favoured not only the traditional 
maritime powers but also new competitors like the United States, 
51 See for example Sergio R. Villalobos, Comercio y contrabando en el Río de la 
Plata y Chile (Buenos Aires 1965); Hernán A. Silva, "La Colonia del Sacramento, el 
Virreinato del Río de la Plata y el Libre Comercio. Mito y realidad en el rompimiento de 
relaciones económicas con el Brasil": idem (ed.), Navegación y comercio rioplatense, 
vol. 1 (Bahía Blanca 1996); Zacarías Moutoukias, "Contrabando y sector externo en 
Hispanoamérica colonial": Marcelo Carmagnani/Alicia Hernández Chávez/Ruggiero 
Romano (coords.), Para una historia de América, 11: Los Nudos, 1 (Mexico City 1999), 
p. 172-197; Allan Christelow, "Great Britain and the Trades from Cadiz and Lisbon to 
Spanish America and Brazil, 1759-1783": The Hispanic American Historical Review 27, 
1 (1947), p. 2-29. 
52 It is the case of José María Cambiaso, a Ligurian merchant whose trade house 
was settled in Lisbon: during the war, he became the greater importer ofRío de la Plata's 
silver and leathers after Agustín Casimiro Aguirre, who was the agent of the powerful 
trader Ustáriz, relative of viceroy Vertíz and representative of the Real Consulado of 
Cadiz in Buenos Aires. Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Economía, Sociedad y Regiones (Bue-
nos Aires 1987), p. 76, 89, and 103. See also Silva, "La Colonia del Sacramento" (note 
51), p. 54-59. Regarding the Cambiaso family, see Catia Brilli, La diaspora commer-
ciale ligure nel sistema atlantico iberico. Da Cadice a Buenos Aires, 1750-1830 (docto-
ral thesis, Universitá degli Studi di Pisa 2008), p. 99-100. 
53 Tulio Halpeón Donghi, Reforma y disolución de los imperios ibéricos, 1750-1850 
(Madrid 1985), p. 81. 
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which together with Hanseatic, Nordic and Turkish ships began to 
trade regularly with South American ports.54 
The Genoese merchants who had settled and prospered in the vice-
royalty of Río de la Plata strongly protested against the spread of 
foreign vessels in the region. In 1802 the shipowners and sorne cap-
tains of vessels anchored in Montevideo, lead by Pascual José Parodi, 
Carlos Camuso and Bernardo della Torre, presented a memorial to the 
cabildo's notary Bartolomé Domingo Bianchi, who was also Genoese. 
The memorial denounced the damages that the Spanish Monarchy had 
suffered over two centuries from English, French, and Dutch intru-
sion. The Genoese traders demanded the immediate withdrawal of the 
decree and hoped for a return to a mythical past, the 16th century, 
when foreigners were practically abstent from the Indias.55 However, 
by then the return to the past was impossible, and soon even the most 
reluctant realized that foreign ships were vital for the survival of their 
trade. 
The independece movements in Latin America damaged Spanish 
Atlantic trade to such an extent that, in 1823, the Crown decided to 
maintain the existing regime of free direct trade between the colonies 
and the allied powers in order to gain the consent of the Spanish mer-
chants who were established overseas.56 This provision c1early did not 
concern Río de la Plata, which had formally dec1ared its independence 
in 1816 and opened its ports to foreign trade in 1810. Thus, Spain 
concentrated its maritime forces in Veracruz, Havana, and Manila, 
agreeing to share colonial trade profits with the other mari time 
powers.57 
54 Tulio Halperín Donghi, Revolución y guerra. Formación de una elite dirigente en 
la Argentina criolla (Buenos Aires 2005, 2nd ed.), p. 47. 
55 Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires (hereinafter AGNBA), IX, 31-1-9, 
lego 23, exp. 3, Montevideo, 10th of March 1802, "Expediente obrado a representacion 
del comercio de esta Capital, del de Montevideo, y la de los navieros capitanes y Maes-
tres de los buques surtos en su puerto, sobre que se prohiban las arribadas a estos opuer-
tos de barcos extrangeros". 
56 AGI, Indiferente General 2465, Real orden sobre comercio por los extrangeros, 
El Rey, Madrid, 10th of March 1824. 
57 Regarding the conditions of the Spanish navy in those years, see Marina Alfonso 
Mola, "La guerre et les transforrnations de la fiotte coloniale espagnole, 1797-1828"; 
Silvia MarzagallilBruno Mamot (eds.), Guerre et économie dans l'espace atlantique du 
XVle au XXe siecle (Bordeaux 2(06), p. 63-81. 
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The Sardinian merchant navy was unable to cope with the compe-
tition in the Caribbean. But in Río de la Plata it found the conditions 
to undertake its Atlantic adventure, playing a complementary function 
to the Spanish monarchy's need to maintain commercial relations with 
the lost colony. In order to penetrate the SouthAmerican routes, Ligu-
rian captains initially did not use their own flag. Marquis Cesare Gri-
maldi, the first Sardinian Plenipotentiary Minister of Rio de Janeiro, 
in 1820 informed Turin that Sardinian vessels usually arrived in the 
ports of Maranhao and Montevideo under the British flag, which they 
got from Gibraltar.58 After establishing the first trade contacts and 
experiencing the safety of the route, Sardinian vessels began raising 
their own flag. The commercial paper British Packet reported that by 
1821 the Sardinian ships' arrivals in Buenos Aires rapidly increased, 
and continued to do so, particularly between 1829 and 1834. 
T ABLE 1: ARRIVALS OF SARDINIAN SHIPS IN THE PORT OF BUENOS AIRES 59 
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The case of the brigantine "Trionfo" reveals that Sardinian penetration 
into Río de la Plata was also supported by local or Spanish merchants 
searching for neutral flags to cover the lack of Spanish vessels. The 
"Trionfo" was hired in 1822 by José Requena, José de Vea Murguía 
and Martín Irazuqui to send a load of leather and other goods from 
Montevideo to Cadiz. "Because of the critical circumstances in which 
the shipment was made" /1:) they obtained the right to pay the same 
customs duties as Spanish vessels paid. Requena had resorted to this 
gimmick also in 1809, when he asked for permission to hire two neu-
58 Marco Mariano/Duccio Sacchi, "La fonnazione della rete consolare del Regno di 
Sardegna nelle Americhe, 1815-1860": Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi XL 
(2006),p.327-370. 
59 Clifton B. Kroeber, La navegación de los ríos en la historia argentina (Buenos 
Aires 1967), p. 131. 
60 AGI, Buenos Aires 589, Consulado y Comercio al Director General de Aduana, 
n. 19, Buenos Aires, 5th of August 1822. 
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tral ships to send a load from Montevideo. He justified his request by 
the emergency caused by the war and the scarcity of available Spanish 
vessels. The authorities not only granted him the permission with the 
same customs exemptions, but they also instructed Requena to load 
the vessels in Cadiz with mercury and Spanish goodS.61 
Thus, the Spanish merchant navy's disappearance in Río de la Plata 
opened a new space to Sardinian ships, which in a few years succeded 
to impose their own flag in the Atlantic despite the competition of 
Great Britain and other maritime powers. The traditional ties that 
Ligurians had woven in Spain played an essential role in this process, 
as is demonstrated by the relevant contribution of Cadiz to Sardinian 
trade in South America. 
THE ROLE OF CADIZ IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF SARDINIAN 
TRADE WITH Río DE LA PLATA 
The crisis of the Spanish empire had not completely annihilated Ligu-
rian trade in Cadiz. The Guía General de los forasteros of 1817 
reveals that severallong established Genoese intermediaries (Ravina, 
Castañeto, Castelli, Colombo, Enrile, Jordan, Merello, Pallavicini, 
Patron, Picardo, Procuran te and Tomati) had remained active in the 
port. Surprisingly, also sorne first-generation immigrants (Firpo, 
Gazzino, Luchi, Lavaggi, Oneto, and Revello) had chosen this port to 
settle their trading houses:62 although their arrival in Cadiz coincided 
with one of the darkest periods of the port's history, these new traders 
consolidated their position by establishing networks with the well-
rooted Genoese merchant families and by taking advantage of the 
Sardinian merchant navy's recovery. 
The association between these old and new farnilies emerges in a 
letter they sent to Turio in 1824 asking for the replacement of the old 
61 Ibidem, Pedro Garibay, Seville, 18th of August 1809; ibidem, D. Josep de 
Riquena, Cadiz, 30th of June 1809. 
62 Guía General de los forasteros de Cádiz para el año de 1817, Imprenta de D. 
Ramón Hoove, Plazuela del Cañón (Cadiz 1817). For more information about these 
families , see Brilli , La diaspora commerciale (note 52) , chapters 2 and 6; and eadem, 
"Da Cadice a Buenos Aires: crisi e rinascita del cornmercio ligure nella nuova configu-
razione dell'Atlantico iberico, 1797-1837": Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, 
XLIII (2009) p. 143-173. 
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and sick Genoese consul Andrea Gherardi by his son Vincenzo. The 
signatories to the proposal, which was welcomed by Turin, were 
Angel Gazzino, Juan Felipe Ravina, Domingo Oneto, Angelo Revello, 
Benedetto Picardo, Luigi Galliano, Nicola Montobbio, Angel Nervi, 
Alessandro Firpo and J. B. M. Cambiaso.63 It is not clear how they 
maintained their business during these critical years for the Spanish 
emporium. In this period most of the goods corning from the interna-
tional market arrived in Spain from Gibraltar: because of the informal 
character of this trade, we cannot be sure about the scope of the 
Genoese involvement in transactions with this British port, but several 
clues 1ead us to think that it was not inconsequential.64 
In regard to Mediterranean trade, Ligurian intermediaries of Cadiz 
easily consolidated direct and exclusive relations with the Sardinian 
merchant marine. This became evident in 1818, when all Sardinian 
ships anchoring in Cadiz were leaving for Genoa and were loaded by 
Gazzino, Gherardi, and Peñasco.65 In November 1819, the commercial 
paper of Cadiz Diario del Vigía registered the presence of three Sardi-
nian vessels, whose loadings were respectively managed by Joaquin 
Luchy, Angel Gazzino, and Benito Picardo.66 
Up to 1830 the Vigía lacks information about Río de la Plata. In 
1828 it noted the arrival of 30 Sardianian vessels but only specified 
the provenance of five of them (the Caribbean), and the destination of 
one (Havana). In 1829, we find only two Sardinian vessels, both going 
to Lima.67 In February 1829, the Sardinian brigantine "Esperanza" 
arrived from Gibraltar with a load of goods imported from Montevi-
63 AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790-1835, Cadiz, 10th of August 
1824. 
64 In the 1820s, Antonio Domingo Jordan Oneto y Cia and Tomas Ravina protested 
several bilis of exchange for transactions involving traders of Gibraltar: AHPC, Cadiz, 
Not. 1825, lego 459, p. 488-489; AHPC, Cadiz, Not. 1825, leg. 459, p . 518-519. There 
was al so a "historical precedent": in 1801 Tomas and Juan Felipe Ravina were arrested 
with G. B. M. Cambiaso for smuggling in Gibraltar: ASG, Archivio Segreto, n. 2673, Il 
Commissario Generale delle Relazioni Commerciali della Repubblica Ligure in Andalu-
sia residente in Cadice [Andrea Gherardi] al Cittadino Sappia Incaricato d' Affari della 
Medesima presso S.M.C., Cadiz, 20th of November 1801. 
63 Diario Marítimo del Vigía (Cadiz 1818). 
66 AGI,Arribadas 196, Testimonio de revisión de navíos, 1809--1819, Lista semanal 
de los buques entrados salidos y existentes en Bahía, Cádiz, 1819, n. 48. 
67 AGI, Indiferente General 2299, Lista semanal de los Buques entrados y salidos y 
existentes en Bahía, 1829. 
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deo, addressed to Joaquin Francisco Luchy.68 This suggests that, at 
this time, Gibraltar was still the main hub for South American imports. 
It was precise1y the untenable competition of Gibraltar that convin-
ced the Spanish authorities to grant Cadiz the privilege of free port, a 
decision we1comed in the city with "a general jubilation" .69 That privi-
lege, in force from 1829 to 1832, opened new opportunities to Cadiz, 
which attracted many vessels that previously preferred to land in 
Gibraltar?O 
The Vigía's data about the ships involved in Atlantic trade between 
1830 and 1835 highlight a clear predominance of the Río de la Plata 
route for Sardinian vessels sailing between Spain and the Americas.71 
The comparison with other foreign ships that left Cadiz for Río de la 
Plata in the same years reveals that Sardinians were second only to 
those of Great Britain.72 The register of Genoa's port confirms the signi-
ficance of that route: in 1833,33 of the 44 Sardinian ves seis departuring 
from Genoa for the Americas were destined to Buenos Aires and/or 
Montevideo.73 
It is interesting to note that most of the Sardinian ships stopped in 
Cadiz only when they were returning. Between 1830 and 1835, 
54 Sardinian ships arrived at Cadiz from Río de la Plata, while only 
14 left Cadiz for that destination.74 Besides, many of the latter were 
68 Manifiesto del bergantin-polacra sardo "Esperanza", su capitan Carlos Lazzolo, 
que entró de Gibraltar el 16 del corriente, consignado a Joaquin Francisco Luchy, Diario 
del Vigía, Cadiz, 25th ofFebruary 1829. 
69 Archivio di Stato di Napoli (hereinafter ASNA), Affari Esteri, Regio Console 
Napoli a Cadice, 1815-1829, fase . 2480, Marco Machiavelli al Cavo De' Medici, n. 4, 
Cadiz, 24th of February 1829. 
70 The Neapolitan consul of Cadiz in June 1829 noted: "It is incredibile to see how 
many goods, people and trade house have arrived from Gibraltar to Cadiz after the free 
port's decree [ .. . ] the trade in that place [Gibraltar] is completely paralyzed, without any 
possibility to recover". ASNA, Affari Esteri, Regio Conso1e Napoli a Cadice, 1820-
1829, fase. 2483, Marco Macchiavelli al Cavo De' Medici, n. 17, Cadiz, 30th of June 
1829. 
71 Between 1830 and 1835,54 of the 65 Sardinian vessels which arrived in Cadiz 
from the Americas carne from Río de la Plata, while 14 of the 20 that left Cadiz for the 
Americas were destined to Buenos Aires or Montevideo. Diario del Vig(a (Cadiz 1831-
1836). 
72 The British ships were 34, followed by the Sardinian Kingdom (14), the United 
States (9), Holland (1), Brazil (1) , Tuscany (1), and Belgium (1) . Ibidem. 
73 ASG, Sanita, 1594. 
74 Diario del Vigía, Cadiz, 1831-1836. 
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coming from Genoa with the hold mostly full. They stopped in Cadiz 
to complete their loads, sell passage for the Americas, and take orders 
for retum loads. This data reveals that emporium of Cadiz had become 
a mere end market, with little control over exports and largely depen-
dent on Sardinian vessels for imports from South America. 
The Sardinian consul in Cadiz, Tapperi di Castellamonte, in 1831 
illustrated the state of commerce: 
"The increase in consular income of the past quarter is the result of the growing 
cornmercial relations between Genoa and Cadiz. It is confirmed by the arrival in this 
bay of numerous national vessels retuming from several ports loaded with sugar, 
coffee, indigo and leather. Our captains' good conduct, economic ability and nautical 
knowledge lead many foreign merchants to prefer Sardinian ships [ ... ]. There are 
also several national vessels leaving for the Americas hired by foreign traders, which 
1 have to assist due to the frequent problems caused by their ingenuous and badly 
organized transactions" .75 
The Sardinian ships' registers also show that the sale of their loads in 
Cadiz was almost exc1usively managed by Ligurian traders, mainly 
the aforementioned Jordan Oneto, Tomas and Juan Felipe Ravina, 
Angel Revello, and Juan Bautista Chapella: Ligurian wholesalers of 
Cadiz had become the principal intermediaries for imports from Río 
de la Plata. 
This "state of grace" was short-lived. The privilege of free port did 
not manage to stimulate Spanish manufacturing in order to cope with 
the monarchy's chronic productive deficit. It could not even retum to 
Cadiz its previous importance in the intemational trade, a purpose that 
definitively vanished after Latin American independence. The rise of 
Ligurian trade reveals that the free port's decree had enriched only the 
foreign merchants, apart from increasing contraband and damaging 
the other peninsular ports: all reasons enough to convince the authori-
ties to withdraw the privilege in 1832. 
In the following years, Ligurian trade in Cadiz did not experience a 
sudden collapse because of the persistent usefulness of Sardinian 
ships in maintaining the commercial relations between Spain and Río 
de la Plata. It is confirmed by the dispatches that Sardinian and French 
consuls of Río de la Plata sent to their respective govemments in 
75 AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790-1835, Tapperi di Castellamonte, 
Cadiz, 10th of July 1831. Translation by the author. 
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1834,16 as weH as by a report which the Junta de Comercio of Cadiz 
addressed to the Ministerio de Marina in 1837 asking for the with-
drawal of a decree that forbade Sardinian ships from landing in Span-
ish ports. This provision was only the most recent consequence of the 
tensions existing between Madrid and Turin because of their respective 
protectionist policies. It was enacted in response to a similar decree 
enacted by the Piedmontese government, which in addition had sus-
pended aH the Spanish consuls in the Sardinian kingdom.77 
The Junta's plea leaves no doubt about the Sardinian merchant 
navy's indispensable role for the trade of Cadiz with Río de la Plata: 
"The merchants of this city have been unofficially informed [ ... ] of the royal decree 
that prohibits entrance into the port to those Sardinian vessels devoid of the certifi-
cate ofthe port of origin's Spanish consuls . [The merchants ofCadiz] have turned to 
this Junta in order to implore Her Majesty to dissolve with a new provision the 
damages caused by this real orden to trade with America [oO.]. Sardinian vessels 
conduct trade with South America both for their structure [ ... ] and for the protection 
granted by their flag . At present our merchants are using these vessels to import the 
goods coming from Buenos Aires , Montevideo, and other ports of that continent. In 
a few days sorne of those vessels will arrive in this bay, but their captains are devoid 
of the required certificate because of the lack of Spanish consuls or vice-consuls in 
the ports from which they come [oO.] so that they won't be admitted, and the trade of 
this port will be sacrified to the poli tic al interests which led to the aboye mentioned 
royal provision [00 '] ' [If the decree won 't be modified], it will only damage the Span-
ish trade, because the loads of the Sardinian vessels belong entirely 10 American and 
Spanish merchants . Sardinian captains will have to land in Gibraltar, so that [oO.] the 
transport of the loads to Spain will be considered as trade with a foreign country 
concerning the payment of hires and customs duties".78 
76 José Carlos Chiaramonte, "Notas sobre la presencia italiana en el litoral argentino 
en la primera mitad del siglo XIX": Fernando J. Devoto/Gianfausto Rosoli (eds .) , L'Ita-
lia nella societii argentina (Rome 1988), p. 44-58, here: p. 55-56. See also José Carlos 
Chiaramonte, Mercaderes del Litoral. Economía y sociedad en la Provincia de Corri-
entes, primera mitad el siglo XIX (Buenos Aires 1991), p. 95 . 
77 ASNA, Affari Esteri, Regio Console Napoli a Cadice, 1830-1839, fase . 2485, 
Marco Macchiavelli a S.E. il Principe di Cassaro - Ministerio de Estado, n. 46, Real 
Orden, 8th of August 1837. 
78 ASNA, Affari Esteri, Regio Console Napoli a Cadice, 1830-1839, fase. 2485, 
Marco MacchiaveIli a S.E. il Principe di Cassaro - Ministerio de Estado , n. 46 , Real 
Orden, 21th of March 1837, n. 16, Junta de Comercio, José María Pastor, vocal Presi-
dente, José María Aguayo, Secretario Contador al Excelentísimo Señor Secretario de 
Estado y del Despacho de Marina, Comercio y Ultramar, Cadiz, 8th of March 1837. 
Translation by the author. 
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Regardless of the decree's modifícation, in the following years Sardi-
nian ships' landings in Cadiz slowly decreased to only fíve in 1843.79 
This was because of the growing British merchant navy's predomi-
nance, the restoration of direct commercial relations between Spain 
and the South American republics, and the contemporary development 
of Spanish manufacturing. Genoa would consolidate its direct trade 
with Río de la Plata, but for the intermediaries of Cadiz and the whole 
Ligurian cornmercial settlement of the bay, the economic opportuni-
ties declined irrecoverably. In a few years the ancient "emporio del 
orbe" 80 had become a mere regional port. 
The parenthesis of 1829-1832 demonstrates that the recovery of 
Ligurian trade in Cadiz had been a consequence of the Sardinian mer-
chant navy's dynamism, favoured by the international conjuncture and 
the neutrality of its flag. But it was a mutual convenience, as the Span-
ish market and the traditional Genoese presence in Cadiz played 
a relevant role in supporting the consolidation of commercial ties 
betwen Genoa and Río de la Plata. 
LIGURIAN MIGRATION TO ARGENTINA. TOWARDS A NEW SYMBIOSIS 
In a few years Argentina also became one of the favourite destinations 
of those Ligurians escaping from the consequences of the Napoleonic 
wars. This migratory flow was so vast that it represented the main 
component of the large Italian settlement in Argentina during the fírst 
half of the 19th century.81 They mainly concentrated in Buenos Aires, 
where in 1836 resided about 5,000 Ligurians.82 This remarkable 
migratory movement cannot be explained only by the "vacuum" left 
by the Spanish navy. What attracted these migrants escaping from 
their own country's conscription policies to a region whose first deca-
19 Molina, "L'ernigrazione Ligure a Cadice" (note 3) , p. 371 . 
80 Gerónirno de la Concepción, Emporio de el Orbe. Cádiz ilustrada, investigación 
de sus antiguas grandezas, discurrida en concurso de el general Imperio de España 
(Arnsterdam 1690). 
81 In 1850,25,000 to 26,000 Sardinians resided in the Argentinean Confederation, 
three quarters of which carne frorn Liguria. Fernando J. Devoto, "Liguri nell' Arnerica 
australe": Antonio Gibelli/Paride Rugafiori (eds.), Storia d'ltalia . Le regioni. La Liguria 
(Turin 1994), p. 653-688, here: p. 662. 
82 AST, Consolati Nazionali, Montevideo, bundle n. 1, 1836-1850, Picolet 
d'Hermillon, Buenos Aires, 3rd of July 1836. 
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des of independent life were tonnented by an uninterrupted series of 
civil wars and international conflicts? 
Independence in the Río de la Plata activated a process of internal 
"Balkanization" that led to the secession of wide areas - Paraguay, 
Alto Perú, and Provincia Oriental (present-day Uruguay) - and to the 
configuration of provincial states contending with Buenos Aires about 
the definition of the new bases of politicallegitimacy and for the con-
trol of the trade's customs revenues .83 
However, this process also created the conditions for the establish-
ment of Ligurian rnigrants in the ports of Río de la Plata. The collapse 
of the colonial order and the crisis of the rnining economy decisively 
reversed the territorial hierarchy. The inland regions linked to silver 
trade (Jujuy, Salta, Tucumán, Santiago del Estero, Córdoba, La Rioja, 
Catamarca, San Luis, San Juan, and Mendoza) were marginalized in 
favour of those of the littoral (Santa Fe, Corrientes, and Entre Ríos), 
Provincia Oriental, and the province of Buenos Aires, which were 
oriented to the production of livestock for exporto Cattle breeding had 
started to expand in the second half of the 18th century due to the 
region's growing integration in the Atlantic trade and the presence of 
waterways (the Paraná and Uruguay rivers) which facilitated the local 
circulation of goodS.84 After independence, this sector would become 
the main source of revenue for the republic. By the middle of the 19th 
century cattle by-products constituted most of Buenos Aires's 
exports.85 
83 At this regard, see José Carlos Chiaramonte, Ciudades, provincias, estados: los 
orígenes de la naci6n argentina, 1800-1846 (Buenos Aires 1997); idem, "Formas de 
identidad en el Río de la Plata luego de 1810": Boletín del1nstituto de Historia Argen-
tina y Americana 'Dr. E. Ravignani' tercera serie, 1,1 semestre (1989), p. 71-92; idem, 
"El federalismo argentino en la primera mitad del siglo XIX": Marcelo Carmagnani 
(ed.), Federalismos latinoamericanos: México/Brasil/Argentina (Mexico City 1993), 
p. 81-127; Miron Burgin, Aspectos econ6micos del federalismo argentino (Buenos 
Aires 1960). 
84 Roberto SchmitIMiguel A. Rosal, "Las exportaciones del Litoral argentino en el 
puerto de Buenos Aires entre 1783 y 1850": Revista de Historia Econ6mica. Journal of 
1berian and Latin American Economic History 3 (1995), p. 581-607. 
85 Iidem, "Las exportaciones pecuarias bonaerenses y el espacio mercantil rioplat-
ense, 1768-1854": Raul O. Fradkin/Juan Carlos Garavaglia, En busca del tiempo per-
dido. La economía de Buenos Aires en el país de la abundancia, 1750-1865 (Buenos 
Aires 2004), p. 159-193; John Lynch, "Las repúblicas del Río de la Plata": Historia de 
América Latina, vol. 6 (Barcelona 1991), p. 264--315. 
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The economic and demographic growth of the so-called cuenca 
rioplatense gave the river trade an increasing protagonism in the arti-
culation between local and intemational markets.86 The rivers became 
not only the Argentinean economy's strategic axis (and one of the 
main reasons for interprovincial conflicts), but also an opportunity for 
Genoese migrants. Due to their experience in cornmerce and naviga-
tion, Ligurians had no difficulty in penetrating this profitable sector: 
in the 1830s and 1840s, they were the largest foreign group engaged 
in river trade.87 They also contributed to the development of the local 
shipbuilding sector by settling small yards for the construction of 
cabotage ships at the mouth of the river and importing vessels and 
naval equipments from Genoa.88 
In critical circumstances, Ligurians established profitable ties of 
reciprocity with the new host society. When the United Provinces of 
Río de la Plata went to war against Brasil for control of Provincia 
Oriental (1825-1828), Ligurian traders asked the authorities of Bue-
nos Aires for numerous cornmercial and privateering licenses in order 
to protect river trade. One of the first was the great shipbuilder Carlos 
Galliano, who asked for a licence in defence of the "national interests" 
and armed his schooner "Anna Bella" with two cannons to combat 
nine Brazilian privateers in the puertos de arriba.89 The govemment 
had enacted a decree that prohibited the arming of ships if their capa-
city was less than 25 tons. Nevertheless, the impossibility of guaran-
teeing the rivers' security caused numerous protests from the captains, 
which led to the decree's withdrawal and to the concession of priva-
teering or cornmerciallicenses even to smaller boats: Captain Domingo 
Grimaldi and Nicolas Siniglia could arm their ballenera "Provincia 
Oriental", and Girolamo Sciurano did the same with his lanchón 
"Recompensa"; Captain José Claveli , by virtue of bis protests, obtai-
ned not only the license of privateering for him and for his second in 
B6 Roberto SchmitlMiguel A. Rosal, "Comercio, mercados e integración en la 
Argentina del siglo XIX": Cuadernos del Instituto Ravignani 9 (1995) , p. 5-118. 
B7 Chiaramonte, Mercaderes del Litoral (note 76), p. 91-96. One third of the ships 
that arrived in the river port of Paraná between 1843 and 1853 were steered by Sardinian 
captains. Beatriz Bosch, "Notas sobre la navegación fluvial, 1843-1853": Ensayos e 
Investigaciones 19 (jul.-dic. 1975), p. 325-345. here: p. 335. 
BB Brilli, La diaspora commerciale (note 52), p. 274-276. 
B9 AGNBA, X, 14-9-7, Informe al Comandante General de Marina, Buenos Aires , 
28th of June 1828. 
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command, Antonio Carbon , but also permission to arm all residents ' 
boats .90 Even though Provincia Oriental was eventually lost and became 
independent, it seems that Ligurian mobilization was successful. The 
data of the ships' arrivals in Buenos Aires reveals that the first great 
increase of Ligurian presence in cabotage trade coincided with the 
war's conjuncture, by going from 891andings in 1823 to 215 in 1828.91 
Engagement in defence of the host society's interests had allowed Ligu-
rians to protect and even extend their own economic activities. 
In the following years, Ligurians continued to play an important 
role in the growing local economy. Though there was no diplomatic or 
commercial treaty between the Argentine Confederation and the Sar-
dinian kingdom - it wasn't signed until1855 - under Rosas's regime 
(1829-1852) Ligurians benefited from informal governmental protec-
tion. They were free to register their own boats under the flag of Bue-
nos Aires, had no problem in starting commercial or productive activi-
ties, and were substantially exempted from military service.92 For 
sorne of them, the maritime conflicts that afflicted the region in the 
following years represented a profitable opportunity: during the 
French blockade of the port of Buenos Aires (1845-1848), the safety 
of the neutral Sardinian flag allowed Ligurian captains to play an 
essential role of cornmercial intermediation.93 
AH this explains why, despite the local political instability and the 
lack of a governmental migratory policy to attract them, in a few years 
Genoese established a larger settlement in Buenos Aires than the one 
in Cadiz. 
90 AGNBA, X, 14-9-7, Informe al Comandante General de Marina, Buenos Aires , 
22nd of June 1828, 27th of June 1828, and 4th of August 1828. See also the cases ofthe 
schooner "Estrella del Sud" , the ballenera "Convención Argentina", the "Trionfo 
Argentino" , the schooner "General Brown" , the lugger "General Lavalle" , the ballenera 
corsario "Recompensa" , the ballenera corsario "Provinciano Oriental", the lanchón 
"Republicano Argentino" , the lanchón "La Venganza de la Carlota" , the ballenera cor-
sario "Carlota", AGNBA, X, 4-5-5 , 1826-1827, and, finally, the case of the ballenera 
"La Liguria",AGNBA, X,14-5-1. 
91 AGNBA, X, 36-8-9, 36-8-10. 
92 Brilli, La diaspora commerciale (note 52), p. 271-320; Juan Carlos Garavaglia, 
"Ejército y milicia: los campesinos bonaerenses y el peso de las exigencias militares, 
1810-1860": Anuario IEHS 18 (2003), p. 153-187, here: p. 159. 
93 During the blockade, Ligurian traders dominated the expeditions from Buenos 
Aires to Brasil and Europe by using Sardinian ships, which were hired also by Argen-
tinean and foreign merchants. Kroeber, La navegación de los ríos (note 59) , p. 236-238. 
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CONCLUSION 
Studies of trade networks and diasporas have shown that imperial 
metropolis' difficulty in coping with "the strength of Atlantic geogra-
phy" offered economic opportunities not only to other great mari time 
powers, but also to small dynamic merchant groups lacking navies , 
trade treaties, and significant political support from the mother coun-
try.94 This was true for Ligurians as well. They structured their partici-
pation in the Atlantic trade by establishing a symbiotic alliance with 
the Crown of Castile. The loss of this privileged positionin the 17th 
century induced them to adopt different strategies to maintain their 
trade with America. Those strategies succeded because they continued 
to fill the Spanish monarchy's needs and never represented amenace 
to the Empire's integrity. 
After Spanish American independence, the Genoese Atlantic trade not 
only persisted but entered a new phase of expansiono While under 
Spanish mercantilism Cadiz was the center of Ligurian trade with the 
Indias, with the disruption of the colonial order Cadiz became the 
springboard for the Sardinian Atlantic adventure. The conflicts that 
reconfigured the Iberian world allowed Ligurians to expand their trade 
and migratory networks in the Río de la Plata, where they were able to 
create new forms of reciprocity with local society and institutions. 
Their story helps us to understand what at frrst glance appears as a 
paradox: the capacity of a mercantile diaspora to prosper within the 
Spanish empire as well as to benefit from its collapse. 
94 See for example the bibliography proposed by Horst Pietschmann (ed.), Atlantic 
History. History of the Atlantic System, 1580-1830 (Gottingen 2002) , p. 33; Bemard 
Bailyn , Atlantic History. Concept and Contours (Cambridge/London 2005); Pieter C. 
EmmerfWim Klooster, "The Dutch Atlantic, 1600-1800. Expansion without Empire"; 
Itinerario XXIII, 2 (1999) , p. 48-69; Jonathan Israel, Diaspora within a Diaspora: 
Jews, Cripto-Jews, and the World of Maritime Empires 1540-1740 (Leiden 2002); Daviken 
Studnicki-Gizbert, A Nation Upon the Ocean Sea. Portugal's Atlantic Diaspora and (he 
Crisis of/he Spanish Empire, 1492-1640 (Oxford 2007). 
